15. Godhra and the Wider Design, Hiranmay Karlekar ,The Pioneer 8 March 2002

The judicial inquiry that will be held into the attack on the Sabarmati Express at Godhra on February 27, which led to 57 Ramsevaks being burnt alive, will doubtless unearth what led to the incident. It is, however, hardly surprising that there is a widespread feeling in the country that Pakistan' Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, which has been conducting cross-border terrorism against India for over two decades, was responsible.

To all appearances, the incident was carefully planned. Otherwise, an altercation could not have brought to the scene within minutes a large number of armed men equipped to set fire to railway coaches. Nor could those who had planned it be unaware of the very serious consequences that could be expected to follow. A look at these would show how these would be tailor-made to serve several designs of the ISI including that of destabilising the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government.

 
It is not difficult to fathom these designs and the assumptions on which these rest. One of the latter must surely be that the incident would enrage large sections of Hindus and cause widespread rioting, if not all over India then certainly in the communally inflammable states like Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. Such an expectation becomes understandable on considering the sharp deterioration in communal relations in India caused by a host of circumstances including Pakistan's sustained cross-border terrorism and the demolition of the historic Babri Masjid in December 1992. Pakistan must have further calculated that with the bulk of the Indian Army deployed along the international border with it and the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, and the para-military formations heavily engaged in countering insurgency and terrorism, the police would have to bear the main burden of preventing and controlling the riots.
                                                                                                                     
Gujarat police has a dismal record in squelching communal riots and the Army has had to be called in almost every time one has occurred. In fact, this writer was witness in June 1985 to an Army unit commanded by Major-General Afsir Karim (now retired and a distinguished defence expert) quickly re-establishing peace in Ahmedabad after the police had miserably failed to do it. Pakistan could, therefore, have logically assumed that the Godhra incident would light in Gujarat a fire that would spread to other states. A further calculation could be that widespread rioting would generate pressure to pull the Army back from the border areas and deploy it extensively on internal peacekeeping. Should India be forced to do so in any significant scale, the result will be a blessing to Pakistan which, given its straitened economy, is finding it difficult to bear the burden of sustaining its troops in positions near the border and the LoC to which they were moved following the forward deployment of Indian troops after the attack on Parliament on December 13 last year.

Even if India does not pull its troops back, vicious, countrywide rioting would further widen the Hindu-Muslim divide and make it easier for the fundamentalist Islamic terrorists outfits to attract recruits. Also, preoccupation with preventing and putting down violence would divert attention from countering terrorism and insurgency at a time when the country's war against both has achieved significant success. If this would give terrorists a much needed breather, the outbreak of large-scale violence against Muslims in India would not only tarnish India's image in the world but also help Pakistan to create an anti-India mood among the Islamic countries, and particularly, Afghanistan with which New Delhi's relations are most cordial much to Islamabad's chagrin. It is perhaps not without significance that the attack on Ramsevak's at Godhra occurred when the chairman of Afghanistan's Interim Government, Mr Hamid Karzai, was visiting India.
                                                                                                                     
The fundamental design, of course, was to destabilise India at a time when its armed forces are locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with those of Pakistan and thousands of trained Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, whom Pakistan has successfully evacuated from Afghanistan, are being regrouped to be unleashed on this country with the advent of summer when the snow on the high mountain ranges melts, and the high-altitude passes become usable. Significantly, the Godhra incident occurred when there was considerable tension in the country-and also between the government and the leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad-over the latter's brinkmanship on the Ram temple issue.

In such a charged atmosphere, the Godhra outrage and the rioting could be relied upon to create a militant mood among Hindus which in turn would encourage the VHP and the Bajrang Dal to implement their threat of defying the government and going ahead with the temple's construction. In that event, the government would have two options before it. It could stop them by force, which would trigger a sharp confrontation with both which, in turn, would bring it down by splitting the BJP. Equally, it could surrender to the VHP and the Bajrang Dal and allow the construction of the temple or steps leading inexorably towards it-which would compel parties like the Telugu Desam party, the Trinamool Congress and the Samata Party to withdraw from the NDA, bringing it down .and causing a serious political crisis.

Not all the consequences that Pakistan might have wanted to follow from the Godhra outrage have materialised. The riots did not spread beyond Gujarat. What happened in the latter, however, is horrifying enough and has strengthened the hands of extremists among Hindus and Muslims and further sharpened the alienation of a section of Muslims. Those who indulged in massive retaliatory violence against Muslims in Gujarat have, therefore, only served Pakistan's purpose. The VHP and its associates would be doing the same if they create a crisis on the temple issue.

The possible argument that this may bring down the government but serve the BJP's long-term interests does not hold water. The Ram temple issue has always been an electoral liability for the party. Consider the result of the assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in 1993-held less than a year after the dismissal of the BJP's governments in these states following the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. The BJP would have romped home in all the four had the temple issue, then red hot, created a wave in its favour among Hindus. Instead its seats came down from 221 in 1991 to 176 in Uttar Pradesh, 220 in 1990 to 116 in Madhya Pradesh and 46 in 1990 to eight in Himachal Pradesh. It was only in Rajasthan that its tally increased from 85 in 1990 to 95 in 1993 and to a considerable extent because of the then Chief Minister Bhairon Singh Sekhawat's personal stature.

The BJP did well in the Lok Sabha elections in 1996 because of popular resentment against the corruption and mal-governance that marked the Congress government ruling at the Centre from 1991 to 1996. In 1998, it emerged as the single largest party as India wanted stability after two minority United Front governments. In 1999, it did well because the people disapproved the way the NDA had been removed from power and a balked at the thought of having Ms Sonia Gandhi, an Italian by birth, as prime minister.

The issues that concern the electorate are democracy, development, prosperity, law and order, corruption and good governance. The VHP and its associates would be doing the country, the BJP and themselves a service if they let the fate of the Ayodhya dispute to be decided by the Allahabad High Court and concentrate on other matters-serving Swami Vivekananda's Daridra Narayan, for example.